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Abstract: Interdisciplinary understanding requires integration of insights from 
different perspectives, yet it appears questionable whether disciplinary experts 
are well prepared for this. Indeed, psychological and cognitive scientific studies 
suggest that expertise can be disadvantageous because experts are often more biased 
than non-experts, for example, or fixed on certain approaches, and less flexible in 
novel situations or situations outside their domain of expertise. An explanation is 
that experts’ conscious and unconscious cognition and behavior depend upon their 
learning and acquisition of a set of mental representations or knowledge structures. 
Compared to beginners in a field, experts have assembled a much larger set of 
representations that are also more complex, facilitating fast and adequate perception 
in responding to relevant situations. This article argues how metacognition should be 
employed in order to mitigate such disadvantages of expertise: By metacognitively 
monitoring and regulating their own cognitive processes and representations, 
experts can prepare themselves for interdisciplinary understanding. Interdisciplinary 
collaboration is further facilitated by team metacognition about the team, tasks, 
process, goals, and representations developed in the team. Drawing attention to 
the need for metacognition, the article explains how philosophical reflection on the 
assumptions involved in different disciplinary perspectives must also be considered 
in a process complementary to metacognition and not completely overlapping with 
it. (Disciplinary assumptions are here understood as determining and constraining 
how the complex mental representations of experts are chunked and structured.) The 
article concludes with a brief reflection on how the process of Reflective Equilibrium 
should be added to the processes of metacognition and philosophical reflection in 
order for experts involved in interdisciplinary collaboration to reach a justifiable 
and coherent form of interdisciplinary integration. An Appendix of “Prompts or 
Questions for Metacognition” that can elicit metacognitive knowledge, monitoring, 
or regulation in individuals or teams is included at the end of the article.
Keywords: interdisciplinarity, metacognition, team cognition, representations, 
expertise, assumptions, pluralism, philosophy
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§ 0. The Challenger Disaster: Failure of Interdisciplinary Team  
(Meta)Cognition
When in 1986 the space shuttle Challenger exploded mid-air during its launch 
at the NASA facilities, killing seven people, this bewildered a global audience. 
That same audience was again astonished when the Presidential Commission 
on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (the Rogers Commission for short), 
which included Nobel prize-winning physicist Richard Feynman, explained the 
direct and indirect causes of this disaster. Among the problems found relevant 
was an optimistic “can-do” mentality at NASA and the risks coming along 
with that. This became obvious in a discussion with NASA employees about 
the infamous O-ring that was the cause of the leaking fuel that caught fire and 
caused the explosion. The decision to launch while the temperature was low 
enough to compromise material properties like those of the O-ring was a matter 
of concern to some participants in that decision-making process. According 
to witness Dr. Petrone, “The prime thing we were concerned about was the 
unknown baseline. We had not launched in conditions of that nature, and we 
just felt we had an unknown” (Rogers Commission, 1986, p. 114, italics added). 
In the case of a complex interdisciplinary project it is not at all unusual nor 
directly worrisome that an element of the problem at stake is unknown. Indeed, 
there is no fundamental limit on what we might learn about a particular object or 
process, not just in the case of its interdisciplinary investigation but even from 
a single disciplinary perspective. How much should NASA’s material scientists 
have known about the material of this O-ring and its behaviors under various 
conditions? What is the temperature range that would have been relevant for 
them to investigate? What chemical interactions with other substances should 
have been investigated by their colleague chemists other than those in the 
earth’s atmosphere or released by the engine? Given that there were many 
factors determining the behavior of the O-ring, the team had to deal with a 
corresponding theoretical pluralism, with each theory–physical, chemical, 
meteorological–accounting only for a limited part of the ring’s behavioral 
variability. Therefore, it was crucial for the individual scientists involved in the 
project and for the team as a whole to reflect upon the potential relevance and 
irrelevance of their insights and of their unknowns and to be ready to adjust 
their earlier relevance estimations. 
In this case, the unknown that would turn out to be of fatal importance was 
shared during a management discussion on the launch decision, yet it wasn’t 
taken seriously enough either by the team as a whole or apparently by the 
material scientists themselves. As a result and in terms to be clarified below, 
it did not figure sufficiently in the team’s mental representations nor in the 
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team metacognition that could have helped their project’s coordination and 
organization. Instead, further consideration of the unknown was overruled in 
favor of other considerations in order to meet the orbiting deadline. Obviously, 
each unknown announced by a sub-team should not necessarily bring a team 
project to a halt, yet each should require a careful evaluation of the nature 
and relevance of the unknown in light of the overall goals and structure of the 
project. It appears that with regard to this case, the management discussion 
(and the interdisciplinary team cognition exercised therein) failed blatantly, 
as the group underestimated the relevance of the O-ring and hence of the 
lack of disciplinary knowledge about its properties under low temperature 
conditions. The Rogers Commission was concerned about this failure and 
devoted considerable time to discussing and analyzing it. One would have 
expected that in a high tech, big science project like this, conducted by a 
very large interdisciplinary team of top tier scientists and engineers, the 
value of metacognitive consideration or “knowledge and cognition about 
cognitive phenomena” (Flavell, 1979, p. 906) would have been recognized. 
Unfortunately, it was not. And indeed, that is too often the case.
As I will argue further below, even accomplished scientists are often not 
accomplished “metacognizers.” Consciously monitoring one’s cognition 
and cognitive processes and regulating them, for example by correcting 
or adjusting one’s learning strategy, is difficult for everyone because 
our cognitive processes usually don’t require such conscious control 
(Georghiades, 2004). In addition, all our learning and knowing involve the 
development of many mental representations, whether they concern the 
skill we’re practicing or the phenomenon we’re investigating or a scientific 
domain we’re familiarizing ourselves with. For effective metacognition we 
must not only be aware of such multiple mental representations but also be 
able to navigate their peculiarities and limitations.
Clearly, with effective individual cognition requiring such metacognitive 
handling of the multiple mental representations involved, effective 
interdisciplinary team cognition among individuals will require even more. 
In addition to monitoring and regulating their own mental representations, the 
members of such a team need to communicate and coordinate their cognitive 
efforts with those of their collaborators. For this they will need to develop 
a mental representation of the team project and its relevant components, 
in which their own position and contributions must be somehow included. 
Moreover, as testified by the dramatic events caused by the insufficient 
consideration of the unknown affecting the Challenger launch, what probably 
does not need to be spelled out for a disciplinary colleague may need to be 
spelled out for colleagues from other disciplines, implying an even greater 
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need for metacognition in such an interdisciplinary context. 
Yet, though team metacognition is required for the process of 
interdisciplinary collaboration, it alone is not sufficient for the integration 
of disciplinary contributions into a more comprehensive understanding 
of the problem at stake. For such integration of disciplinary insights in an 
interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary context, there are multiple methods 
that can help resolve the barriers between different disciplines. One set 
of methods focuses on the fundamental assumptions that are specific to 
each discipline, as will be discussed below. Philosophical reflection and 
discussion within a team of the epistemological, metaphysical, and normative 
assumptions implicitly held by representatives of different disciplines are 
helpful in addressing and overcoming their differences. Individual and team 
metacognition and such philosophical reflection can be considered to be 
complementary and mutually useful. Making implicit assumptions explicit 
and adequately navigating these as a team presuppose a sound metacognitive 
process.
From this brief description it is obvious that collaborations among people 
with differing disciplinary expertise is difficult, partly due to the cognitive 
and metacognitive processes involved. When the Rogers Commission 
addressed that difficulty in its recommendations, it pointed out the need 
for “improved communications” because of a “tendency of management 
isolation” (Rogers Commission, 1986, p. 200). However, it is implausible that 
improved communications alone would make up for a team’s apparent lack of 
metacognitive skills, a repair that would require different solutions including 
a better understanding of how metacognition should play an essential role 
in an interdisciplinary team project.1 Indeed, we might expect the contrary, 
since team members to a large extent rely upon their tacit or implicit cognition 
and are subject to an associated “bounded awareness” (Kumar & Chakrabarti, 
2012). They will either not notice their own lack of knowledge or not recognize 
the importance of insights that other members bring to the table.
Avoiding the deficits in individual and team cognition and collaboration asks 
for a better understanding of several underlying processes and their connections. 
To that end, I will bring various insights from cognitive science and philosophy 
to bear on expertise, interdisciplinary understanding, and collaboration. The 
Challenger launch will figure as an example of interdisciplinary collaboration 
1  Drawing lessons from the Challenger disaster, Weir refers to our “failure to 
learn” at four different levels: political, academic, administrative/managerial, and 
philosophical (Weir, 2002). The latter amounts to a lack of “comprehension of our 
own history,” which still does not come close to the metacognition that is involved 
in adequate forms of learning.
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as some of the potential goals of such collaboration are implied in it, these 
goals ranging from the production of new and comprehensive–theoretical–
insights to practical problem solving and the development of robust policies 
or technologies (Klein, 1990; Menken & Keestra, 2016). The article is divided 
in two main parts, section 1 being devoted to individual cognition and section 
2 to interdisciplinary team cognition. In both contexts, I will consider how 
combined insights from cognitive science and philosophy can enhance the 
relevant processes involved. In § 1.1. I will present an account of expertise 
as being enabled by a process of Representational Redescription, yielding 
multiple mental representations that are increasingly structured and complex. 
This multiplicity of mental representations and their potential interferences 
can lead to undesirable results and § 1.2. describes how experts learn to 
monitor and regulate their cognition via metacognition and deliberate practice 
so as to avoid such results. Metacognition can also prepare an expert for 
interdisciplinarity, and § 1.3. considers how philosophical reflection upon 
disciplinary assumptions is complementary to metacognition. During team 
interdisciplinary collaboration, individual members are developing team 
mental representations,  a process that I will discuss in § 2.1. Successful team 
cognition is often supported by implicit team coordination, yet I argue in § 
2.2. that team metacognition is also needed, for example if an unknown needs 
proper response. Finally, in § 2.3. I will again consider how metacognition 
and philosophy serve a joint purpose, it now being interdisciplinary team 
cognition. Having argued that metacognition and philosophical reflection 
prepare an interdisciplinary team for the development of a more comprehensive 
understanding, in the Concluding Remarks I will briefly consider the process 
of Reflective Equilibrium that can help teams to navigate the theoretical and 
methodological pluralism characteristic of collaborative interdisciplinary or 
transdisciplinary research.
§ 1. Individual Cognition and the Challenge of Navigating Pluralism 
As mentioned in the introduction, even a simple object like a rubber O-ring 
can be investigated by different disciplines that might offer distinct insights or 
representations of it. For instance, a representation of its physical components 
and properties might look different from a representation of its chemical or 
mechanical components and properties. Each of these representations implies 
an explanation of a limited set of its characteristics and behavior under a 
specific range of circumstances, and the representations do not necessarily 
overlap. This might be easier to understand if we consider the case of a 
complex psychiatric disorder, the understanding of which depends upon a 
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complicated bio-psycho-social model, with many additional historical and 
environmental factors playing additional roles. We can observe in almost 
every such academic domain a methodological and theoretical pluralism 
since the investigation of almost every object or phenomenon requires the 
application of different methods, yielding different theoretical accounts 
(Mitchell, 2002). It is important for all scholars–including in that term 
scientists and other academic experts–to realize that each theoretical account, 
focusing on one or more determining factors involved, has usually only a 
limited relevance. We can represent one and the same object or phenomenon 
and its determining factors in many different ways and each representation has 
some relevance while none has sole relevance in light of our present cognitive 
aims and goals (Wimsatt, 2007). Scholars should be aware of this, and also 
aware that they need to learn to metacognitively monitor and regulate their 
own representations and navigate the corresponding pluralism both when 
working individually and when working as a member of a team in order to 
avoid some of the pitfalls associated. This first section will focus on issues 
involving individual cognition.
§ 1.1 Expertise and the Development of Multiple Mental Representations 
It seems surprising that not all scholars are well aware of these pluralisms 
and the limitations accompanying each representation of an object. After 
all, we can observe something similar in our daily lives and those of our 
children and students. Indeed, in every instance of gaining expertise such as 
acquiring a skill or familiarizing oneself with a particular knowledge domain, 
we are as part of that process developing more than a single cognitive, or 
mental, representation. Indeed, a process of Representational Redescription 
is involved, elaborating upon a previously established representation as I 
will explain below.
As communicating beings, we are constantly using representations: 
gestures, words, and sentences that somehow contain information beyond the 
surface properties of the movements, sounds, and letters we share with each 
other. Since these representations “stand in” for the content or information 
they convey, they are in need of further cognitive processing or interpretation. 
Take for example, the representation of a simple arithmetic task: adding one 
and one. We can do that by using two fingers, by writing it in Roman or 
Arabic numerals or in digital bits, or by speaking. Irrespective of overlapping 
contents, each form of representation requires separate mastery, involves 
different frameworks of interpretation, has its own practical advantages and 
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disadvantages, and brings along many distinct associations.2 As a result, we 
might learn to select among representational formats, for example, to combine 
them–as in illustrating words with our fingers–or to adjust them, depending 
upon the circumstances and our aims. Such flexible use of representations 
is made possible by the “standing-in” position of representations that also 
entails that they are always associated with processes of interpretation and 
understanding (Von Eckardt, 1999). Learning to communicate implies 
therefore both becoming aware of these possibilities and taking advantage of 
them, while becoming equally aware of how others make such choices so as 
to be aware of the potential confusion and mistakes that may result as they do.
In the context of the study of cognitive states and processes, scholars have 
introduced the notion of “mental representations.”3 These are continuously 
and automatically formed by our brains and play a role in how cognitive 
states and processes handle various sorts of information–like about the task 
at hand, about relevant environmental cues, about motivations to continue or 
stop–during all our behavioral, communicative, and other actions.4 Explaining 
these actions, scholars assume that these cognitive states and processes “are 
constituted by the occurrence, transformation and storage (in the mind/brain) of 
information-bearing structures (representations) of one kind or another” (Pitt, 
2  For this article I had to refrain from going into the corresponding philosophical 
discussion ongoing since Plato and Aristotle about the intimate interdependence 
(or dialectics) between epistemology and ontology, or between the representations 
of reality and how the world presents, appears, or discloses itself. This notion is 
particularly prominent in hermeneutic philosophy since Heidegger’s Being and 
Time, and Gadamer’s Truth and Method, forming a cornerstone of Dieleman’s 
contribution on transdisciplinary hermeneutics in this Special Section of Issues in 
Interdisciplinary Studies (Dieleman, 2017). 
3 Other words have been introduced for referring to stored units of information, mem-
orized and employed  for multiple functions, each with specific characteristics, like 
“knowledge structures” (Grafman, Sirigu, Spector, & Hendler, 1993), “mental mod-
els” (Johnson-Laird, 2005), “schemas” (Norman & Shallice, 2000), and “scripts” 
(Cooper & Shallice, 2000).
4  The concept of “mental representations” is not undisputed in cognitive neuroscience. 
Thagard notes that notwithstanding lack of agreement about their nature, mental 
representations figure at the center of cognitive neuroscience’s interdisciplinary discourse 
(Thagard, 2005). Yet some authors even argue that such representations are unnecessary 
when describing brain and cognitive processes in dynamical systems theoretical terms 
(Keijzer, 2002; Van Gelder, 1995). However, such critiques fail to recognize that such 
terms can perhaps help in describing the behavior of cognitive systems,. We have to 
allow a complementary explanatory role to representations (Bechtel, 1998). Mental 
representations are particularly relevant for explaining forms of learning, knowledge 
transfer between domains, and correction of cognition and behavior (Clark & Karmiloff-
Smith, 1993). They are also necessary for explaining “representation-hungry” cognitive 
tasks such as tasks that involve absent, non-existent, or highly abstract contents, or tasks 
that require selective attention (Clark & Toribio, 1994). 
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2017). Interestingly, studies have shown how related yet different tasks can 
facilitate or rather interfere with each other because they activate some of the 
same mental representations. Different cognitive processes are not employing 
completely separate, dedicated representations, as it appears. Instead, whether 
it is for speech, for perception, for imagination, or for behavior, multiple 
cognitive processes are making use of partially “shared representations” 
(Grezes & Decety, 2001). Such–largely–overlapping mental representations 
help to explain why thinking about “kicking a ball” can facilitate our visual 
detection of a ball or why our body’s moving in one direction does hamper 
the grasp of a sentence that describes the opposite direction. So although the 
production of a sentence about e.g. kicking a ball will involve representational 
elements that are specific for its linguistic or its behavioral features, there are 
also representational elements that are shared with our imagining of such an 
action that are employed in both cases (Barsalou, 2003).5 
Studying particular forms of expertise more closely, psychologists and 
cognitive scientists can partly explain expert performance via the mental 
representations an individual has developed, their number, their structures, 
their interactions, and other properties. Investigating them can be difficult as 
such representations and their properties can often be only indirectly deduced 
from observations, since even experts are not always able to consciously 
articulate the relevant details of their cognitive states and processes–let 
alone animals and children who are acquiring skills.6 Numerous studies 
have been able to demonstrate that experts have typically developed more, 
and more complex–often hierarchically structured, multi-level–mental 
representations than beginners. A consequence of this is, that even though 
an expert’s specific action might be identical to a beginner’s, his or her 
underlying mental representations might turn out to be quite different.7 Such 
differences might then have notable consequences in some situations. 
In the case of chess masters, for example, De Groot and later colleagues 
5  Investigating the structure and contents of such representations and how they 
enable and constrain cognition and behavior can be done in relative independence 
from questions about how such representations are actually implemented in specific 
components of the brain or otherwise (Marr, 1982).  
6 As mentioned above, one way to investigate the mental representations that 
individuals use is to ask them to think aloud when solving particular problems. Other 
methods focus on experts’ better, faster and more accurate recall of materials from 
their domains of expertise, or their superior perceptual skills or faster categorization 
ability (Chi, 2006a).
7  The same holds for the brain processes that underlie expert cognition and behavior 
and that have developed in more efficient processes than beginners show, enabling 
further connectivity with additional cognitive tasks in experts: Experts and beginners 
appear also at the brain level to perform “different tasks” (Petersen, van Mier, Fiez, & 
Raichle, 1998).
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described how the masters’ better and faster recall, recognition, and 
understanding of a large number of chess boards depended upon a grouping 
process that was later called “chunking” (Chase & Simon, 1973; de Groot, 
1946). Instead of cognitively representing all pieces and their positions 
independent from each other, chess masters assembled–implicitly–during 
years of practice and study tens of thousands of mental representations of 
groups of pieces in specific positions. These representations sometimes 
consisted of small chunks, while others represented higher-level structures 
(Sala & Gobet, 2017). In addition to their role in enabling recognition of 
a particular chess board, these representations had after many years of 
active practice become associated with preferred chess responses. Indeed, 
it was discovered that some of the associations connected to certain 
representations were even emotional in nature, explaining the intuition or 
urge to respond with a specific chess move to a particular board (Chassy & 
Gobet, 2011).8 Similar observations have been made in studies of musicians 
and sportspersons, for example, who’ve mastered complex motor routines in 
response to difficult musical scores or dynamic field positions. In the case of 
scientists, their representations tend to be very complex, containing not just 
superficial descriptive properties of the object under investigation, but also 
some deeper-level relevant organizational principles. Biologists were found, 
for example, to develop representations of a complex biological system that 
included complex causal structures with associated unobservable causes and 
multiple functional relations and interdependencies among those structures. 
Non-experts were found to lack such rich representations (Brulé & Labrell, 
2014).
Yet an observation that is relevant in our context is that experts’ 
development of such complex representations does not imply that the 
simpler representations they established at an earlier stage of learning are 
completely abandoned or replaced, as is made visible in Figure 1. Instead, 
it appears that development and learning are to some extent dependent upon 
a process called Representational Redescription (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; 
Mareschal, et al., 2007). This implies that learning partly consists of the 
elaboration and adjustment–the redescription–of previously developed 
mental representations, with both the older and the redescribed versions 
8  During reading and comprehension of a text, to give another example, the 
representation that a particular reader develops of its contents also co-activates 
other representations or representational elements that he or she has developed over 
time, including motivational and affective ones (van den Broek & Kendeou, 2008). 
Research into “embodied cognition” suggests that even mental representations of 
relatively abstract contents are grounded in action-oriented and situated interactions 
individuals have with their environments (Wilson, 2002).  
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remaining available and being activated under particular conditions. In the 
words of the influential developmental cognitive scientist Karmiloff–Smith, 
in order to learn, a human can “exploit internally the information that it has 
already stored (both innate and acquired), by redescribing its representations 
or, more precisely, by iteratively re-representing in different representational 
formats what its internal representations represent” (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992, 
p. 15). Performing at an expert level does therefore also require that an 
individual become aware of this feature of the learning process, learning 
to monitor it and regulate it, for example regulate the activation and 
influence of less sufficient, older representations. This is not easy, as not all 
assembled representations are equally accessible to conscious monitoring 
and regulation.
Figure 1. Learning and the acquisition of expertise in 
a particular field or discipline entail that an individual 
develops new mental representations pertaining to 
the domain at stake that do not replace previously 
developed, simpler ones. A beginner possesses just a 
few representations; they then increase in number and 
interrelation, with experts employing many more and 
more complex structured ones. Vertical lines show the 
parallel availability of representations stemming from 
these different learning stages. 
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Rapidly, and often without explicit instruction, children demonstrate in 
their cognition and behavior how they develop a large number of mental 
representations, like representations of linguistic structures, of named objects 
like houses or animals with many properties, of actions and skills, and so on. 
As children employ these representations for their perception, understanding, 
and behavior, they’re continuously and usually implicitly adjusted in response 
to different forms of feedback, some from caregivers and educators, some 
from confrontations with their environment, some generated internally.9 
Along the way, children slowly learn to articulate the mental representations 
they’re employing when explaining their cognition or behavior, yet such 
articulations are often limited. In the case of language, for example, even 
adults can have difficulties in explicitly articulating why a certain sentence 
is incorrect even though they can claim explicit expertise in all relevant 
grammatical and syntactical rules. So even if development and learning do 
lead to our ability to partially explain the structure of mental representations 
underlying our expertise, we still don’t reach a point where we can 
completely uncover all that we implicitly know about a certain domain and 
how we solve specific problems in it (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992).10
One might expect that since scientists master their trade through explicit 
education, practice, and assessment, they would always be able to make 
their scientifically relevant mental representations explicit and would not 
rely upon implicit ones. Yet psychological and other studies demonstrate 
that we should not expect such a strict distinction in this context. Even 
in higher and abstract cognitive processing humans do all employ mental 
representations that remain implicit: Indeed, it is appropriate to place 
implicit and explicit cognition and the associated implicit and explicit mental 
representations on a continuum rather than strictly separate them (Augusto, 
2013; Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002). Consider the fact that students do not 
enter university as a tabula rasa but usually have preexisting conceptions 
of the phenomena in their disciplines. Academic education rather adds to 
9 What is involved in learning and development according to neuroconstructivist 
accounts is a process of Representational Redescription, during which early 
developed representations are–implicitly, unconsciously–redesecibed, rendering 
additional representations with novel properties available for other cognitive and 
behavioral tasks (Mareschal, et al., 2007). Apart from these properties, it is the 
implicit-explicit distinction that is relevant in most situations (Butler, 2007).
10 Agreeing with Karmiloff-Smith’s idea that learning involves a process of 
Representational Redescription during which novel representations are developed 
by the learner while he or she retains earlier developed–implicit–ones, Taber 
describes how in learning science such new representations often provide elaborated 
components of earlier representations, or offer wholesale alternatives (Taber, 2008).
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their implicit representations than simply replacing them, so alternative 
representations often continue to influence their cognition by blending with 
newly developed mental representations, leading to inconsistent ideas, for 
example, about canyon formation in the case of geology students (Sexton, 
2012). This continuum between implicit and explicit cognition explains 
why even experts’ cognitive processes still unconsciously employ implicit 
mental representations of phenomena in their fields of expertise, albeit often 
in tandem with explicit representations they’ve derived from their education.
As noted earlier, mental representations may differ decidedly, too. For 
example, physics experts have been found to explicitly develop different 
kinds of mental representations in parallel, like a model that is an adequate 
structural analogue of the physical system in question and a mathematical 
representation of the relevant structures and their quantifications (Dunbar 
& Fugelsang, 2005). The challenge then is to coordinate and combine these 
multiple representations in a consistent and productive way, and perhaps 
add associated visual images as well. With growing expertise experts can 
gradually meet this challenge, even when not all representational details 
can be made explicit (Greca & Moreira, 2002). However, even physics 
experts are at times not able to monitor and control the influence of the 
more primitive and implicit representations that in children determine 
expectations about object mechanics. Physical forms are important in folk 
physics representations and even though experts know about their irrelevance 
compared to more abstract and invisible structures and properties, they still 
fall prey to mistakes that are due to their entertainment of such implicit 
representations (Rouse & Morris, 1986). Increased awareness of how our 
cognitive processes and representations figure in our performance, perhaps 
developed through education, can help people avoid such mistakes. 
Explicit and verbal education exploits the process of Representational 
Redescription in ways that animals don’t have at their disposal;  language 
“emerges as just one more level of redescription, albeit one that provides 
rich manipulability and a powerful means of cultural transmission” (Clark & 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1993, p. 505). By establishing such explicit representations 
we can modify or correct the implicit representations we might have, perhaps 
quickly “debug” a flawed performance: A golfer might focus on changing the 
“wrist component of her swing . . . instead of learning the whole swing anew” 
(Clark & Karmiloff-Smith, 1993, p. 492). A novel explicit representation can 
also help the integration of previously separate representations, for example by 
representing abstract, functional properties of superficially different systems. 
Indeed science experts demonstrate intuition and creativity in their field by 
developing such novel and integrating representations when they discover 
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analogies, draw comparisons, and so on, processes that often defy conscious 
control or articulation (Litman & Reber, 2005).11 
Why all this attention to mental representations and the process 
of Representational Redescription in the context of investigating 
interdisciplinary research and collaboration? Because greater awareness of 
them may help those involved in such research to overcome some obstacles 
and to improve the quality of individual work and teamwork. Indeed, 
successful individual experts and successful teams are partly characterized 
by their attending more to these features. As studies in fields as distinct 
as music, sports, crafts, and science have shown, it is partly due to their 
assembly of large and varied sets of representations during many years of 
study and practice–adding up to at least some 10.000 hours–that experts 
can be characterized as individuals who reliably outperform most others 
in a specific domain according to relevant standards (Ericsson, 2006b; 
Sternberg, 1998). They, too, have to cope with different representations 
that are not always consistent with each other nor optimal in any given 
situation, potentially leading to suboptimal performance. Still, this is the 
reason why we should expect experts to be significantly better if not perfect 
at monitoring and regulating the processes and representations underlying 
their performance than beginners. The next section will delve into this 
subject, after which we will then look at the implications of these insights 
for those involved in interdisciplinary team collaboration, considering how 
the team performance can be supported by mental representations and the 
team members’ cognitive processes employing such representations.
§ 1.2. Monitoring and Regulating Cognition: Metacognition and Deliberate 
Practice 
Concurring with our common expectations, the superior performance of 
experts depends upon their superior ability to cognitively process complex 
situations or tasks in their field of expertise, while responding also more 
flexibly and adequately than beginners in the same field. Nevertheless, there 
are limitations to expertise and even some challenges that are precisely 
the result of having gained expertise. Indeed, one can even refer to the 
“brittleness” of expertise, for experts can sometimes perform worse than 
beginners in exceptional situations when relying upon expertise can be 
11  Scientific creativity can hence be explained in similar terms to those used to explain 
other forms of creativity, by referring to cognitive processes and the representations 
involved in them, with experts being somewhat able to better–albeit not completely–
control these than beginners (Boden, 2004; Thagard, 2012).
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counterproductive. Overly confident in recognizing a particular situation 
and allowing the response that is associated with the situation’s mental 
representation to be executed, an expert may overlook a relevant but novel 
detail (Lewandowsky & Thomas, 2009). Indeed, studies of experts in 
several domains have found such a weakness in their performance, together 
with other weaknesses, like their demonstrating a bias or fixedness towards 
sometimes inadequate responses. For example, medical experts have been 
found to be inclined to offer a diagnosis of a patient that falls within their 
own domain of expertise even though a more creative solution may be 
required (Chi, 2006b).12 In such cases, the beginner’s lack of expertise and 
lack of a large set of implicitly employed mental representations can be 
a blessing, requiring him or her to carefully scrutinize the situation and 
consider potential response options without such a bias or lack of creativity.13 
One may wonder, therefore, whether interdisciplinary work would be better 
served with beginners, who are less vulnerable to some weaknesses than 
experts are? Fortunately, though, it is not impossible for experts to meet 
these challenges and mitigate the weaknesses they may be prone to.
Given these challenges it is not surprising, therefore, that learning and 
acquisition of expertise usually include raising awareness of these challenges 
and instilling some capabilities that will assist one in coping with them, by 
guiding one’s own cognitive processes. This requires that time and effort 
should be devoted to what has been called “metacognition” for some 40 years 
now: “knowledge and cognition about cognitive phenomena” (Flavell, 1979, 
p. 906). In the decades since metacognition was first defined it has usually 
been further subdivided in two components: metacognitive knowledge and 
metacognitive skills. Based upon a review of the research on metacognition in 
12  In other cases, experts such as experienced teachers can succumb similarly to 
stereotypical or even prejudiced social responses. Specific strategies can alleviate 
that risk as I’ve explained elsewhere (Keestra, 2017).
13  Notwithstanding these questions and in accordance with the arguments presented 
here, both for individuals and teams, (cultural) metacognition and creativity have 
been found positively linked to each other (Crotty & Brett, 2012).
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science education, these two components have been further specified.14 
I’ll quote the authors’ explication of the three components of metacognitive 
knowledge in full: 
Knowledge of persons refers to self-knowledge of the variables 
that influence the individual’s cognitive activity, knowledge of the 
cognition of others and knowledge of the universals of people’s 
cognition. Knowledge of tasks refers to understanding how the 
nature of task conditions, demands and goals affects cognitive 
activity. Knowledge of strategies refers to knowledge about thinking, 
learning and problem-solving strategies that students might use in 
order to achieve goals. (Zohar & Barzilai, 2013, p. 123)
Metacognitive skills include the skills of planning, of monitoring, of 
evaluating, and of self-regulating cognition.15 Such skills help to answer 
questions like what are current priorities, how must consecutive steps be 
planned and evaluated, where can further assistance be found? These skills 
determine how we select tasks and strategies in a given context, assess and 
evaluate our own progress towards a cognitive goal, change our strategies 
accordingly, and so on (Zohar & Barzilai, 2013).16 An additional target for 
these skills can also be the environment in which an expert has to perform; 
removing obstacles or developing facilitating structures can help to improve 
outcomes or ease the task itself, for example (Zimmerman, 2006). Coping 
with environmental challenges will become more important in the case of 
14  Zohar and Barzilai add in their review a third component of metacognition 
that receives relatively little attention and is also left further aside here, to wit: 
metacognitive experiences. Flavell offers a description of these: “Many metacognitive 
experiences have to do with where you are in an enterprise and what sort of progress 
you are making or are likely to make” (Flavell, 1979, p. 908), like when you’re feeling 
surprised, close to a solution, confident about your memorization, and so on. Obviously, 
such motivational and affective features of our cognitive processing play an important 
role in learning and development as well. Science education could be improved by 
taking metacognition more seriously as an ingredient, because such meta-reflections 
and skills help students to better navigate the difficulties of scientific inquiry (White, 
Frederiksen, & Collins, 2009 ).
15 A slightly different account proposes a three-step metacognitive cycle: an initial 
step of planning goals and strategies, a monitoring step, and then an improvement 
step that consists of reflecting on past and future goals and strategies (White & 
Frederiksen, 2005). 
16  Hofer has drawn attention to specific epistemic beliefs that are involved in both 
metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive skills. An important dimension of the 
former concerns whether a learner believes that knowledge is simple or complex, 
and whether it can be certain or rather tentative and evolving. Metacognitive skills 
are also determined by beliefs about knowing as a process, which concern both the 
evaluation of the source of one’s knowledge and also its justification (Hofer, 2004).
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interdisciplinary collaboration.
Since some of the expert’s cognitive processes and the representations 
involved are implicit and hence escape consciousness, as I’ve argued 
above, the application of metacognition might not be an easy task. Indeed, 
as we’ll see below, experts develop within their scientific field or discipline 
so many routine procedures in response to a great number of well-observed, 
unsurprising events that their metacognitive alertness might not be optimal. 
Instead of recognizing that a current event deviates in meaningful ways from 
similar recurring events, experts might find it so familiar that they overlook 
the event’s deviation, responding automatically in a habituated fashion.17 
Optimally prepared experts would therefore have to have the metacognitive 
knowledge about the risk they might automatically employ a suboptimal 
strategy before they would apply their metacognitive knowledge and skill in 
selecting adequate strategies to avoid this lapse. Adequately metacognizing 
experts would consequently devote more time and attention to the situation 
and–based upon their expertise and acquired set of representations–focus 
on notoriously difficult or overlooked features of the situation, for example. 
That is, in addition to the allocation of extra cognitive resources, they would 
also strategically select particular representations to articulate and further 
scrutinize, develop, modify, or combine with other representations in order 
to adequately respond to the situation (Sternberg, 1998). In such situations 
of self-monitored and self-regulated representational or conceptual change, 
“intelligibility, plausibility and fruitfulness are metacognitive considerations,” 
playing an important role (Rowlands, 2009, p. 18, italics added).
These observations underscore once more why expertise cannot rely 
solely upon implicit cognition. Admitting that explicit cognitive processes 
and conscious development of mental representations may play a role early 
in the learning process, as during instruction, phenomenological philosopher 
Hubert Dreyfus has nonetheless denied that those who develop expertise 
learn to consciously guide all their cognition (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). 
However, this view of multiple stages of  expertise acquisition has not received 
convincing empirical support. Observations of expert behavior disprove the 
notion that experts are just engaged in “holistic intuition” without invoking 
more analytical processes when solving a problem (Gobet & Chassy, 2009).18 
17 Such predictions of likely future situations, like the probability of next moves in 
chess, are also dependent upon the complex representations that experts develop. These 
have  a template structure with “empty slots” that allow the representations’ application 
even if some details are different from time to time (Didierjean & Gobet, 2008).
18  This is not to deny that hampering the automatic performance of experts or asking 
them to explicate their performance can disturb and impede their superior perfor-
mance.
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On the contrary, observations confirm that what distinguishes experts from 
other accomplished learners is that experts “counteract automaticity by 
developing increasingly complex mental representations” whereas those in 
the latter group do not commit much more time and attention to the practice 
required for that further development – often out of a lack of motivation 
(Ericsson, 2006a, p. 685). 
In other words, expertise consists of an intricate interaction among 
different cognitive processes: conscious, explicit cognitive processing that 
includes metacognition on the one hand, and automatic, implicit cognition 
on the other.19 This interaction can be particularly well observed in the 
process of deliberate practice, which plays an important role in acquiring 
and improving expertise. Not just amateurs during the early learning phase 
but also accomplished experts improve their performance by engaging in 
deliberate practice, aiming to improve the memorization, employment, 
and refinement of the mental representations involved in cognition and 
behavior, as well as their integration with other representations. Indeed, 
we are all familiar with the reading, musical, mathematical, or sports 
exercises that we have carried out in order to increase our reading speed, 
to learn a particularly difficult piano passage by heart, or to master new 
mathematical computations. These efforts benefit from deliberate practice, 
the focused and repeated practice of predefined exercises accompanied 
with conscious monitoring and evaluation of our performance with the 
immediate identification of errors and their correction via new strategies 
or procedures.20 It is the amount of such deliberate practice in any and all 
areas, more than biological or social factors,  that explains the development 
of expertise (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993). Moreover, experts 
distinguish themselves from merely decent performers in that they continue 
to engage in deliberate practice even after they have reached the level of 
decent and virtually automatic performance, which for most individuals is 
satisfactory enough that they lose the motivation to invest more time and 
19  This interaction has led to so-called dual system (or process) theories of expertise, 
according to which the implicit and automatic system and the explicit, controlled 
system contribute differently to expert performance (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). 
Concurring with the analysis presented here, metacognition implies Representational 
Redescription that occurs during the interaction between these two systems 
(Timmermans, Schilbach, Pasquali, & Cleeremans, 2012).
20 As I’ve argued extensively elsewhere, even consciously developed, 
explicit rules and intentions can after sustained practice sink in and become 
implicit and affect in unexpected ways ongoing cognition and behavior 
(Keestra, 2014).
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attention in such practice. 
Concurring with the earlier observation that expertise and its properties are 
also relevant in the domain of academia and science is the fact that deliberate 
practice influences the acquisition of scholarly expertise, as well.  Such 
deliberate practice impacts the development of a large and differentiated 
set of representations and their cognitive processing in scholarly experts, 
supporting their performance in their disciplinary fields. This holds not just 
for the perceptual and behavioral tasks that have to be performed in many 
academic disciplines, like the observations and diagnoses that medical doctors 
make as well as their subsequent surgical procedures. Deliberate practice 
also has an impact on the complexity of the patterns scholars discern and the 
reasoning underlying their description and explanation of their observations 
(Ericsson, 2004). In addition, creativity and problem solving benefit from 
deliberate practice when it involves recognizing analogies between different 
representations of the same or similar  systems, connecting structural system 
models with their mathematical descriptions, recognizing pattern similarities 
between different studies of the same phenomena, and so on (Bruun & 
Toppinen, 2004). Such deliberate practice can take the form of collective 
deliberate practice performed in an interdisciplinary team, which we will 
investigate further below. Before we go there, I will briefly discuss how 
philosophical reflection can add to metacognition and deliberate practice in 
improving expertise and particularly the capacities and skills necessary for 
interdisciplinary problem solving.
§ 1.3. Preparing for Interdisciplinarity: Metacognition and Philosophy
It may appear that I’ve presented an unrestricted praise of expertise above, 
yet  earlier I mentioned the risks of  brittleness, bias, and fixedness on certain 
task representations or performances from which experts often suffer. 
Related to these weaknesses and especially relevant to our investigation of 
interdisciplinary team collaboration is the fact that expertise is found to be 
relatively domain specific. This is not surprising as expertise depends upon 
the time and attention invested in the development of a large but special 
set of implicit and explicit representations that are exercised, memorized, 
further elaborated, combined, adjusted, re-organized, and so on. Indeed, one 
becomes an expert precisely by developing this specific and large set of 
rather complex representations that are underpinning cognition and behavior.
Particularly with regard to behavioral routines and procedures, such domain 
specificity is apparent. A violin virtuoso relies on very specific hand patterns 
and sequences that are different from those of a piano player. Similarly, a 
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football player’s “perception-motor cycles” are different from those of 
a basketball player. Yet with regard to the processing of possible scores or 
of field positions–i.e. the perceptual and cognitive processes preceding the 
motor actions–the generalizability or transfer of expertise is much greater. 
Important here is the concreteness or abstractness of the representations in 
question. For muscle movements, the representations determine particular 
and minute body movements and are hence very concrete and specific. In 
contrast, representations involving the decision where to move the ball are less 
dependent upon such specific body movements and hence more generalizable 
across different positions–like keeper and attacker–and even across different 
sports (Abernethy, Baker, & Cote, 2005; Bruce, Farrow, & Raynor, 2012). 
Comparison of sportspersons and persons like sports writers and coaches–
who are equally involved in sports as observers without employing any 
perception-motor cycles–has demonstrated that the observers are better 
than non-experts but worse than sportspersons in making correct perceptual 
judgments about ball shots (Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, & Urgesi, 2008). 
Apparently, only players can rely upon embodied cognition when perceiving 
and judging visual cues from another player’s posture and shot that feed into 
their cognitive processing and contribute to their superior anticipation skill. 
Being  engaged in actual sport performance implies they have established 
many connections at different levels of detail among the representations 
underlying different features of their domain specific expertise (Williams, 
Ward, Knowles, & Smeeton, 2002).21 When it comes to interaction and 
communication among experts more generally, embodied cognition does 
play an important role in “transdisciplinary hermeneutics” according to the 
arguments provided by Dieleman in his contribution to this Special Section 
(Dieleman, 2017).
If we now consider scholarly expertise and its domain specificity, we have 
to remember the pluralism implied in the study of complex phenomena I’ve 
discussed earlier. Complex phenomena can be investigated from multiple 
disciplinary perspectives, each associated with its own theoretical accounts 
and methodological approaches, and each having only limited relevance. As 
we now know, the Challenger’s leaking O-ring can be explained partly by its 
chemical and associated mechanical properties and partly by the meterological 
conditions during launch that had a critical impact on those properties. During 
21  This implication of the embodied nature of our cognition and cognitive representa-
tions confirms once more that–and this holds generally–representations are always 
relative to a certain purpose or practice. It is in that sense radically different from 
what has been called a Cartesian idea of representation as “mirroring” nature (Rorty, 
1979).
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the launch decision discussion among those at the table neither had neither 
sufficiently developed a comprehensive cognitive representation to integrate all 
the relevant elements and their interconnections, nor sufficiently evaluated their 
respective weights. This is not surprising as scholarly expertise privileges “self-
referential communication,” exchanging insights and experiences regarding a 
particular domain or discipline within a specific communication network and 
ignoring those from other domains or disciplines (Weingart, 2010). 
Academic disciplines differ in what Kuhn has called their “disciplinary 
matrix,” consisting of heterogeneous elements like the discipline’s prominent 
theories, laws, and symbolic generalizations, particular metaphysical 
assumptions, pragmatic values for conducting proper studies, and prominent 
exemplars that students have to make their own in order to become a member 
of the discipline’s community. Consonant with what we’ve said above about 
how acquiring expertise depends upon the collection of a set of implicit and 
explicit representations, Kuhn has pointed out that aspiring scholars usually 
do not learn this matrix explicitly by itself, but learn it indirectly through 
their immersion in concrete applications and problem solving. The lack of 
conscious direction in the learning process means their metacognitive ability 
to monitor and regulate their cognitive representations and processes is not 
necessarily well developed, often making scientists “little better than laymen 
at characterizing the established bases of their field, its legitimate problems 
and methods” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 47).22  
The self-referential nature of disciplinary communication and its 
limitations do not rule out the fact that, like other experts, scholars have 
learned within their discipline or field to develop and employ multiple 
representations that support their perceiving, thinking, and acting. Indeed, 
both cognitive and computational studies suggest that abstract and 
conceptual knowledge is preceded by perceptual skills, building upon the 
complex implicit representations of patterns and chunks that support these 
skills (Gobet, 2005).23 However, notwithstanding such remaining influence 
22 Kuhn refers  with approval to Polanyi’s concept of “tacit knowledge,” writing 
“much of the scientist’s success depends upon ‘tacit knowledge,’ i.e., upon knowl-
edge that is acquired through practice and that cannot be articulated explicitly” 
(Kuhn, 1970, p. 44, footnote 1).
23  Such inconsistency in responses can be due to the engagement of the two distinct 
cognitive systems or processes that underlie human cognition and behavior: one 
automatic and implicit, the other conscious and explicit. Avoiding such inconsistency 
would require an explicit estimation of whether implicit intuition might be reliable 
in current conditions, or not (Kahneman & Klein, 2009), or a conscious attempt to 
“debias” the often biased implicit reasoning that scientific experts at times rely upon 
(Croskerry, Singhal, & Mamede, 2013).
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of implicit representations, particularly characteristic for most disciplines is 
the central role of explicit and idealized abstract or formal representations–
be they concepts, models, functions, or otherwise. 
These abstract representations may initially be more difficult to cognitively 
process than concrete and detailed representations of an object or system, but 
learning to do so is important because they serve important scholarly goals. An 
important benefit is that, due to their “concreteness-fading” and abstractness, 
such representations are easier to transfer to other disciplinary domains that 
may appear different but that share abstract similarities (Goldstone & Son, 
2005). However, for such transfer of abstract representations across domains, 
it is crucial to distinguish properly which concrete details or connections must 
be captured in the abstract representations, and which can be left out, a process 
requiring extensive metacognition. An abstract representation of a mechanical 
system can usually exclude temperature conditions, for example, yet such 
exclusion might not be wise where more extreme temperatures are concerned, 
as the Challenger’s launch team discovered. In other words, relevance 
again can be seen to play an important role in the use and development of 
representations in a discipline. And of course it is needless to say that this 
relevance is often context-dependent and changes during a discipline’s 
sometimes erratic history. 
In addition to metacognition, scholars benefit from philosophical reflection 
on (implicit as well as explicit) assumptions underlying the cognitive 
representations and processes common in their field.24 Philosophical 
reflection appears indeed to be a natural ally to metacognition, given that 
both entail a second-order activity or reflection, requiring individuals 
to not take their own thinking and thoughts for granted but to critically 
scrutinize them (Rowlands, 2009). Philosophical reflection in this context is 
understood as particularly focusing on the epistemological and ontological 
but also normative assumptions that have shaped the focus of those in a field 
on some causes and factors and not others, preferences for certain models 
in their discipline, interest in some details with others considered irrelevant, 
application of some methods deemed best for investigating theoretically 
constructed objects, and so on (Menken & Keestra, 2016; Repko & Szostak, 
2017). According to the current approach, assumptions form part of the 
background against which representations are grouped, structured, and 
interpreted within a discipline. They imply a certain hierarchy among its 
percepts or concepts, for example, or they determine why certain dimensions 
24  In his 1978 essay on the question “Why Interdisciplinarity?” Kockelmans 
already argued that disciplines “in the final analysis rest on implicit philosophical 
assumptions” (Kockelmans, 1998, p.  85). 
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of a phenomenon are considered useful for empirical research and others 
are not. In scholarly disciplines as in music or sports, beginners gradually 
develop more complex and structured representations by implicitly applying 
the assumptions common in these fields. Assumptions are implicitly 
contributing to experts’ representations and performance as, for example, 
when scholars quickly distinguish primates from monkeys in biology or 
recognize non-linearity in a certain graphs,  even as musicians resolve the 
famous Tristan chord, or players pass the ball while avoiding offside. In 
turn, when scholars start reflecting philosophically upon these assumptions, 
they come to recognize some of the principles underlying their complex 
representations. Such philosophical reflection can help to prepare them to 
recognize potential connections to neighboring fields by sensitizing them to 
alternatives and clarifying differences and similarities among assumptions 
in different fields (Looney et al., 2014). Figure 2 illustrates how an expert 
further develops expertise with the processes of metacognition and 
philosophical reflection playing an important role, preparing him or her for 
drawing connections with insights from other experts.
Figure 2. An expert engages in metacognition and 
philosophical reflection about his or her thinking. The 
expert reflects specifically about a learning process (in the 
cloud) and the set of representations it has yielded. Such 
second-order reflections also prepare the expert for the 
integration of an additional insight from another expert 
incorporated into the complex mental representations, 
such as the square added here.
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However, one obstacle to scholars’ preparedness for connecting to other 
disciplinary fields is the widely held yet mistaken assumption that insights 
from their discipline will remain intact once these are put into connection with 
others. More often than not insights concerning the properties of a phenomenon 
observed in isolation must be modified once it is integrated as a component 
into a more complex phenomenon, or connected otherwise. Emergence of a 
complex phenomenon like consciousness from the large collection of neurons 
and their connections that constitute the brain is only one of many examples. 
Representations–explicit and implicit–underlying scholarly work on a 
phenomenon should be adjusted in tandem with novel insights (Bechtel & 
Richardson, 1993), requiring necessary metacognitive knowledge and skills. 
Summarizing the preceding sections, we’ve arrived at the following 
insights: (1) Irrespective of the particular domain–music, sports, or 
scholarship–the acquisition of expert cognition and behavior consists in 
part of the development and employment of a large set of representations 
that are organized and differentiated in complex ways with some being 
implicit and others being available for conscious and explicit articulation; 
(2) Although acquiring expertise partly depends upon deliberate practice 
which entails the monitoring and regulation of their cognitive processes 
and representations, experts are still relatively weak meta-cognizers; (3) 
Theoretical and methodological pluralism imply a limited relevance of 
specific representations, which makes it crucial that scholarrly experts 
keep on monitoring and regulating their disciplinary representations; (4) 
In addition to metacognition, scholars would benefit from philosophical 
reflection on the epistemological and ontological assumptions that constrain 
this pluralism and its corresponding representations, preparing them for 
forging connections to those in other disciplines and their representations. 
In the next sections of this article, we will extend these insights to 
interdisciplinary team collaboration, clarifying how they have an impact 
both on the mental representations team members need to develop and the 
extra metacognitive and reflection implied as necessary in that task.
§ 2. Interdisciplinary Team Cognition: Facing the Next Level 
The Challenger team offers an obvious example of failure to acknowledge 
and respond to a reported unknown adequately. A more positive example of 
interdisciplinary team collaboration, also from aeronautics, is given in an 
influential article on distributed cognition titled evocatively “How a cockpit 
remembers its speeds.” Its author draws attention to the fact that in the 
context of a team effort such as flying an airplane we should focus not just 
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on individual cognitive processes and the mental representations involved 
in them, but also on the whole “socio-technical system.” In the cockpit’s 
case this system operates adequately with clearly divided tasks, appropriate 
lines of communications, and well defined decision procedures based 
upon familiar kinds of information, employing all the individual experts’ 
cognitive processes (Hutchins, 1995). In contrast to the team involved in the 
pioneering Challenger launch, a regular airplane’s cockpit team follows well 
practiced and standardized routines and protocols while sharing a common 
language. How, though, can we be sure that if a novel unknown presented 
itself to such a team, it would elicit an adequate response from the team? 
It is useful to reflect in more general terms on what it takes to collaborate. 
As philosopher M. E. Bratman points out, even a relatively simple task like 
painting a house together usually involves collaborators dividing up the task 
and coordinating the distributed component tasks involved in the project. 
They agree upon the color, whereupon one buys the paint, another sands the 
house before a set date, after which another grounds it, and so on. Many of 
the cognitive and behavioral tasks are being carried out by an individual, with 
the others trusting and relying upon him or her.25 Importantly, they must keep 
each other posted about relevant changes in their individual contributions or 
new ideas they’d like to implement. However, and this is important, according 
to this philosophical theory of planning agency the collaborators don’t need 
to know all details of each other’s contributions as long as they are supportive 
of each other and responsive to each others’ intentions and actions. Finally, all 
the collaborators need to remain committed to the joint activity and its goals 
so they can work trustfully towards them (Bratman, 2013).26 
Collaboration thus entails a mixture of the relative independence of 
individual contributors and a purposeful communication and coordination 
of these contributions on the basis of mutual trust and support. In the case 
of interdisciplinary scholarly collaboration, though, collaborators usually 
cannot rely upon standardized routines and protocols and a shared language. 
On the contrary, as was noted above, their disciplinary  training has prepared 
25 The cognitive processes of mutual understanding and empathy required for 
collaboration are supported by the development of “shared mental representations,” 
enabled by so-called mirror neuron systems. This cognitive neuroscientific 
explanation concurs in several respects with a hermeneutic approach to understanding 
and “mimesis” (Keestra, 2008).
26  In order to support trust and commitment in interdisciplinary teams, organizational 
measures can be implemented like the strategic agreements presented in this Special 
Section of Issues in Interdisciplinary Studies by Lash-Marshall, Nomura, Eck, and 
Hirsch, 2017. Naturally, irrespective of such formal agreements, implicit trust and 
commitment still play an important role.
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them for “self-referential communication” with disciplinary “networks of 
meaningful communication” being more fractured and specialized than ever. 
Even though there is increasing demand for cross-disciplinary collaborations, 
“disciplines and their derivatives, specialties, and research fields, remain the 
principal organizational unit for the production and diffusion of knowledge,” 
prohibiting rather than advancing interdisciplinary collaboration (Weingart, 
2010 p. 13).27 In addition, disciplines are still the source of the criteria 
commonly used for assessing such collaborative interdisciplinary research 
(Holbrook, 2010). And yet, scholars are expected to be able to collaborate, 
integrating the insights from their primary discipline with those of colleagues 
from other disciplines–when engaging in interdisciplinary research–and with 
those of extra-academic participants–when engaging in transdisciplinary 
research (Klein, 2010; Menken & Keestra, 2016; National Academy of 
Sciences, 2004).28 It will not surprise the reader that I will argue that for 
such collaboration to be successful it should be supported by metacognitive 
knowledge and skills complemented with philosophical reflection.
As we have seen in the previous sections of this article, disciplinary 
expertise is to some extent based upon the metacognitive ability to monitor 
and regulate the implicit and explicit cognitive processes and representations 
involved when collaborative work is attempted. Yet, the complexity of 
interdisciplinary collaboration means that additional requirements must 
be taken into account by the team and its individuals. We will discuss 
these now in terms of the additional team mental representations and team 
metacognition required.
§ 2.1. Interdisciplinary Collaboration and Team Mental Representations 
The tasks of an expert meteorologist who was a member of a cockpit team 
– or of the Challenger launch management team – look rather different than 
if the expert were working alone. Obviously, being part of a team implies 
27  This remains the case even when there is a clear trend towards various forms of 
scholarly collaboration that can be observed in recent decades, given an increasing 
number of multi-authored articles in many fields and an increasing number of 
academics operating in collaborative teams, a portion of which are interdisciplinary 
(Porter & Rafols, 2009). Yet at the same time, it has often been noted that the 
institutional and educational structures that surround and constrain scholarly work 
are still far more supportive of disciplinary than of inter- or transdisciplinary 
collaboration (Pfirman & Martin, 2010).
28 The “dilemma of expertise” that affects scholars  is that they can generally no 
longer just display their expertise but will always be interacting with situations and 
audiences external to it (Nowotny, 2003).
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that good communication is now an additional task. Yet team collaboration 
is not identical with a number of experts doing their own jobs in isolation 
with the addition of some communication about their task performance and 
its results. To begin with, the team tasks and goals now influence the goals 
of each individual expert’s performance and the constraints under which he 
or she has to operate. In the case of a meteorologist, what meteorological 
insights are required given the aircraft’s trajectory and when, and how, 
must these insights be made available to the rest of the team? Keeping the 
Challenger launch’s fatal unknown in mind, a meteorologist might well ask 
what information he or she needs from other team members and whether 
they are aware of such expectations. For example, it may dawn on him or 
her that a change of the aircraft’s flying altitude would be relevant because 
meteorological conditions might change accordingly, yet the navigator might 
not be aware of this and might not communicate such a change to her, so the 
possible relevance of such information should be made explicit. However, only 
larger altitude changes would be truly relevant, so the navigator should know 
when to inform him or her and when not to bother about altitude changes. 
Clearly this meteorologist must metacognitively reflect upon his or her own–
partially implicit–knowledge and then consider what others might know, how 
they might appreciate meteorological insights, when might be the right time 
to present these, and so on.  Obviously, such reflection is also necessary for 
other team members, adding many extra challenges to their usual tasks. Yet 
even apart from such metacognition, teamwork as such requires that members 
develop pertinent mental representations over and above the ones associated 
with their individual performance. 
As team members, experts need to develop mental representations of 
how their performance is now part of a team performance involving others’ 
mental representations, too. Studies of the interactions of such team mental 
representations have yielded different results, with some convergence 
among them. Since teams differ in their composition, team tasks, and goals, 
as well as the conditions under which teams operate–under fast-changing 
conditions, for example, or divided over different locations–team mental 
representations do differ. However, notwithstanding these differences, 
team members usually develop mental representations concerning their 
collaboration that include the following four types of information: task-
related, team-related, process-related, and goal-related. With these types 
of information, the “who, what, why, when, and how of the team” are 
Metacognition and Reflection by Interdisciplinary Experts | 147
Stability, Instability, and Interdisciplinarity
represented cognitively (Wildman et al., 2012).29 I will review what is 
implied by this inventory and then add insights presented earlier about how 
expertise depends upon the development of multiple representations and 
metacognitive knowledge and skills.
In task-related representations the team members represent what they 
know about the task at hand and the situation in which they are performing 
the task: The meteorologist was determining relevant weather conditions 
during the upcoming Challenger launch, for example. Yet for actually 
carrying out this task, members invoke team-related representations that 
capture information about the location of necessary expertise in the team. 
Who is an expert in what domain or skill, for example, and what levels of 
expertise can be expected from each of them? Building together upon their 
collective, yet distributed, expertise requires the coordination mentioned 
earlier, including the necessary commitment and trust as preconditions for 
the coordination to succeed. Such contents belong in the third category of 
process-related representations that contain information about the teamwork 
and the interaction processes it involves. Finally, the fourth category of 
goal-related representations “is not referencing the requirements of the task, 
the characteristics of the team, or the team interaction processes but rather is 
focused on knowledge or understanding of an overarching goal or mission 
relevant to the team” (Wildman, et al., 2012, p. 93).
Representing information concerning the task, the team, the team process 
and the goals of the interdisciplinary project does not exhaust the relevant 
information required for the team mental representation. As we learned in 
the previous sections of this article, experts are also characterized by their 
ability to monitor and regulate their cognitive processing and representations, 
even though not all of them can be made explicit and available to conscious 
control. Development and learning, we argued, depend in part on a 
common cognitive process of Representational Redescription that allows 
humans to build upon previously acquired knowledge and skills and to 
develop new and creative insights by employing previously established 
representations (Clark & Karmiloff-Smith, 1993). Indeed, experts have 
been found to engage in deliberate practice during which they explicitly 
29  An earlier proposal about the contents of team mental representations suggested 
that information is included about equipment, task, team, team interaction, and the 
problem situation (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993), whereas a more 
recent one suggested an additional role for the representation of interface tools and 
communication skills (von Davier & Halpin, 2013). The latter reflects probably the 
increased importance of virtual networking and managerial skills in academia and 
underscores how mental representations are a function of learning and development, 
even if they gradually become implicit.
148 | Keestra
focus on modifying a flawed representation or developing a novel one, often 
after verbal instruction or after physical demonstration by someone else 
(Ericsson, 2006a). Once an expert starts collaborating with other experts, 
this challenge of monitoring and regulating relevant representations so as to 
allow for learning is expanded, complicating the collaboration significantly. 
How can a team of experts working together develop comprehensive and 
coherent representations if it is already such a challenge for individual 
experts to monitor and control their own sets of activated representations 
when solving a problem while avoiding inconsistency among them? 
Clearly, then, attending specifically to this dimension of cognitive 
processing and representations is important for collaboration to succeed. 
If a team is neglecting the complexity of aligning cognitive processes and 
representations for a team composed of interdisciplinary experts, it might 
easily slip into forms of groupthink, for example. Since experts’ previously 
assembled sets of representations steer their subsequent perception, 
recognition, understanding, and responses to novel tasks and situations, there 
is a tendency for team mental representations to converge gradually to the 
overlapping representational contents that are shared by all team members. 
As non-overlapping knowledge and skills are more difficult to perceive, 
understand, and work with, they may receive less attention, and as a result 
the team may miss out on such knowledge and skills (Cacioppo, 2007). 
Avoiding this risk, each interdisciplinary team should learn to recognize and 
make productive use of non-overlapping representations, acknowledging 
that neglecting to do so can seriously impede its efforts and successes. 
Consequently, in addition to paying attention to the information involved 
in team representations, an interdisciplinary team should also specifically 
attend to representation-related or meta-representational information. 
Importantly, such meta-representational information should also concern the 
team’s doubts or convictions about its own cognition or knowledge that stems 
from elsewhere (Sperber, 1985). The Challenger’s team failed in adequately 
meta-representing at several levels–both among the material scientists and 
within the management team–the fatally important unknown.30 Below we 
will argue that such meta-representational monitoring and regulation should 
be included in the task of team metacognition. 
30 A positive development is that explicit meta-representation is becoming increasingly 
common in the context of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research into 
complex problems, as can be seen from reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change. Included in what is called “2nd order science,” in addition to their (1st 
order) findings, scientists report about theoretical presuppositions of their models and 
uncertainties inherent in these models (Aufenvenne, Egner, & von Elverfeldt, 2014).
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§ 2.2. Monitoring and Regulating Interdisciplinary Team Cognition
Obviously, if an interdisciplinary team can employ standardized routines and 
protocols like those of a navigating cockpit, the need for team metacognition 
will be limited. Yet even if such routines and protocols are in place, some 
coordination will be necessary. There will be need for mutual exchange of 
relevant information required for the performance of subsequent tasks, attentive 
timing of individual task performance such that it facilitates integration with 
the tasks of other team members, and so on. Much of this might occur in the 
form of implicit team coordination, but even then team members still have to 
employ representations of how their colleagues represent their individual and 
the team’s tasks and take these meta-representations into account in shaping 
their own cognition and behavior. According to a review of effective implicit 
team coordination, it consists of two elements:
(1) anticipation, which is revealed in the expectations and 
predictions team members formulate regarding the demands of the 
task and the actions and needs of others, without being directly 
notified of these actions or needs; (2) dynamic adjustment, which 
appears in those actions taken by team members on an ongoing 
basis in order to mutually adapt their behavior. (Rico, Sánchez-
Manzanares, Gil, & Gibson, 2008, p. 165)
Since implicit coordination does not require the time or (cognitive) resources 
required for explicit coordination, keeping coordination implicit appears to 
be most effective and particularly attractive under stressful circumstances 
(Burke, Stagl, Salas, Pierce, & Kendall, 2006). However, anticipation and 
dynamic adjustment in many cases are not sufficient to optimally coordinate 
an interdisciplinary team. Perhaps coordinating implicitly will suffice for 
a narrowly interdisciplinary team, composed of experts in closely related 
disciplines like the natural or the life sciences that largely share overlapping 
representations concerning concepts, theories, and methods. However, 
in the case of a broadly interdisciplinary team, implicit coordination may 
no longer be sufficient since the team members’ cognitive processing and 
representations typically diverge much more in such cases (cf. Newell, 
2007; Van Dusseldorp & Wigboldus, 1994).31  In all cases, teams that do not 
metacognize will easily fall prey to the risks noted earlier,  like missing out 
on underestimated unknowns, group thinking, or experiencing brittleness 
31 “Disciplinary adequacy” in other disciplines is always required of persons engaged 
in interdisciplinary collaboration, as without it neither implicit nor explicit coordi-
nation will be possible (cf. Repko & Szostak, 2017). Collins and Evans’ distinction 
between “interactional expertise” and “contributory expertise” is useful here, as the 
former is generally sufficient for members of an interdisciplinary team to have re-
garding the disciplines of other team members (Collins & Evans, 2002).
150 | Keestra
outside the team’s domain of expertise.
Remember that team mental representations that accompany collaborations 
have been found to generally include task-related, team-related, process-
related, and goal-related information (Wildman, et al., 2012). So how 
might team metacognition have an impact on these and influence the 
process of interdisciplinary collaboration? The coordination of such team 
collaboration, I am arguing here, requires any team to engage with both 
elements of metacognition that were distinguished in § 1.2: metacognitive 
knowledge and metacognitive skills. As noted in that earlier section, 
metacognitive knowledge can be divided into three elements that influence 
cognitive processing and representations: knowledge about how persons 
function as knowers, knowledge about how tasks can influence cognition, 
and knowledge of cognitive strategies. Metacognitive skills are involved 
in guiding, monitoring, controlling, and regulating cognition and learning 
(Zohar & Barzilai, 2013). 
Particularly during the start-up phase, team members individually and as 
a team determine tasks and divide them up according to their respective 
expertise and also determine a process to reach their collective goal. If they 
are not involved in a routine task, this start-up will require explicit team 
coordination demanding that each individual member explicitly articulate 
and discuss his or her expertise. In § 1.1 we argued that this is in itself a 
challenging task, and it is even more challenging now it is part of a process 
during which initial team mental representations are formed and then 
subsequently adjusted as a result of the team’s metacognitive discussions. 
If team members are developing different representations and don’t address 
these differences, failure to do so will impact negatively on the team’s tasks, 
process, and goals. This situation is shown in an analysis of a case of flawed 
team collaboration. 
The authors of this analysis describe how “misalignment” of team 
representations started early on as the team’s data-analyst implicitly assumed 
a support role and defined his expertise and tasks much more narrowly than 
his colleagues did. The other team members implicitly expected him to be 
able to perform more tasks, based upon practical considerations and their 
expectations concerning his expertise. (Such expectations are often influenced 
by the available tools, impacting implicitly upon the representations of 
potential tasks and goals of the team and its individual members.) Resolving 
these inconsistencies and the consequently misaligned team representations 
would have required much more explicit communication in order to adjust 
and align them. Unfortunately, the team did not recognize how valuable such 
team metacognition would have been, since the “Failure to communicate, or 
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even to be aware of the need for communication, was particularly striking” 
(DuRussel & Derry, 2005 p. 217). However, what the analysis still fails to 
emphasize is that such communication would only have been possible and 
useful if the analyst and other team members were able to individually and 
collectively subject their own mental representations–including their team 
mental representation–to metacognitive reflection.  
Given the difficulty of individual metacognition, does this interdependence 
between individual and team metacognition make it unlikely for most teams 
to sufficiently metacognize together about their tasks, team, process, and 
goals? Fortunately, research shows that metacognition in social settings can 
help to mitigate some of the challenges of individual metacognition. It can 
foster individual metacognition as each team member is confronted with the 
metacognitive self-reflections of others, receives feedback, and considers 
the self-regulation strategies of others, for example. The positive effects 
of such social metacognition can include enhanced individual motivation 
(Chiu & Kuo, 2009). This may be even more the case when collaborators 
from other disciplines–or who otherwise bring other dimensions of diversity 
to the team, for that matter–invite the individual experts involved to reflect 
upon their expertise and contributions in uncommon ways and hence foster 
their metacognition.32 Indeed, in this way, metacognition at the individual 
and at the team level can mutually reinforce each other, allowing the team 
to develop into an effectively learning team (Salas, Stagl, & Burke, 2004).
Investigations from the field of the “science of team science” offer valuable 
insights into how team metacognition might be facilitated, starting from the 
observation that metacognition can indeed contribute to the effectiveness 
of science teams (Fiore & Vogel-Walcutt, 2010).  One lesson from these 
investigations is that during the different phases of the knowledge acquisition 
process by science teams, different sets of “metacognitive prompts or 
metacognition inducing strategies” can be used for team metacognition 
conversations. Wiltshire et al. present a list of such prompts that fits a three-
phase training cycle of preparation, execution, and reflection upon a project; 
the prompts are applicable to adaptive interdisciplinary teams in general.33 
The listed metacognitive prompts mainly target the knowledge, tasks, and 
goals that individuals have and need, information on which is useful for the 
32  Chiu and Kuo also note that care is needed regarding some potential difficulties 
associated with individual and social metacognition. Although social metacognition 
can limit some of the difficulties of individual metacognition, it can in turn lead 
to unnecessary confusion, impede collaboration, and suffer from implicit effects of 
status and cultural differences (Chiu & Kuo, 2009).
33  “Adaptive responding” is taken to be characteristic of effective teams, whether 
they’re engaged in training or in problem solving tasks (Burke, et al., 2006).
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others to know, too. Some prompts address specifically the collective level of 
the work and focus on team cognition and behavior (although less on social 
and affective topics). Examples of prompts for each phase are: What roles will 
each of you play? Why is certain knowledge important for your teammate to 
know? Are there alternatives to your chosen planned and executed behaviors, 
and if so, what are they? (Wiltshire, Rosch, Fiorella, & Fiore, 2014, 1157). 
Further examples of “Prompts or Questions for Metacognition” may be 
found in the Appendix at the end of thisarticle. Importantly, such questions 
will affect both individual and team mental representations, which will be 
modified or redescribed: Interaction between intra-personal and inter-
personal representational change is the result. Such representational change is 
particularly important for team cognition to succeed, but it is also challenging 
(Hall, Stevens, & Torralba, 2005). 
Understandably, given the at times problematic mutual interactions 
between individual and team metacognition and the complex ways in which 
these affect the team mental representation, it has been noted that leadership 
can fulfill an important role in this context. As the metacognition that occurs 
at the individual and team levels affects also the mental representation that 
individuals hold concerning the team itself–including information about 
the tasks, team, process, and goals of the team’s project–it can also create 
divergence and confusion within the team. Leaders can help to develop and 
maintain the coherence of a team, creating shared affect, cognition, and 
behavior, in part by fostering the team’s metacognition (Salas, et al., 2004). 
The contribution by Lash-Marshall and colleagues to this Special Section 
of Issues in Interdisciplinary Studies discusses facilitative leadership and 
its role in guiding discussions on perceived obstacles to collaboration, on 
group decision-making, and on goals and processes necessary to reach those 
goals (Lash-Marshall, et al., 2017). These contents imply that a facilitative 
leader should be able to guide conversations that allow the team to develop a 
coherent team mental representation, thus engaging in metacognition even if 
metacognition is not mentioned as such.
The concern for the divergence or convergence of the members of a team 
is usually framed in terms of shared or distinct assumptions. Although it was 
mentioned in § 1.3 above that metacognition and philosophical reflection are 
kindred, since both are second-order activities, it is the latter that is much more 
prominent in strategies that aim to improve team cognition and collaboration 
(and convergence). It was also mentioned there that, in addition to metacognition, 
philosophical reflection on the epistemological, metaphysical, and normative 
assumptions of their disciplines could aid individual experts in understanding 
the principles that guide and structure their mental representations pertaining 
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to the field. Moreover, this activity would also prepare experts to connect 
their representations to those of colleagues from other disciplines, facilitating 
future interdisciplinary integration. The next section will consider how team 
philosophical reflections can be connected to team metacognition and further 
contribute to interdisciplinary collaboration.
§ 2.3. Interdisciplinary Team Cognition Enhanced by Metacognition and 
Philosophy
Team metacognition, we noted above, helps team members monitor 
and regulate their individual and collective representations concerning 
the distribution of tasks within a team and the process that offers the 
necessary coordination to fulfill the team’s goals. Such coordination is 
facilitated yet not entirely ensured with the presence of shared protocols, 
concepts, methods, etc. Even in the case of a navigating cockpit, the team 
needs the metacognitive knowledge and skills to consider whether these 
protocols and other elements are coherently contained in the representations 
assembled by team members, including potential alternative strategies 
they could employ. More importantly, metacognition is required in order 
to raise awareness about the inapplicability of these representations in a 
particular situation. Such team metacognition was blatantly lacking during 
the Challenger’s launch when the unknown about the O-ring should have 
alarmed the engineers more and subsequently played a different role in the 
team process.34 It seems, though, that the engineers themselves were hesitant 
about the value of their insight and that the dismissive response from the 
management cut their metacognitive process short, instead of encouraging 
them to engage in further team metacognition.35 The heterogeneity of the 
team making the launch decision should have been reason enough for 
such team metacognition, particularly given the broadly interdisciplinary 
composition of the team. 
In light of this example and many other examples, it is remarkable 
that metacognition does not appear as an omnipresent ingredient in 
interdisciplinary education and research, and in the discussions about these. 
Indeed, in the circa 1500 pages of the array of literature that has appeared 
34  The risks implied by the unfamiliar temperature conditions were exacerbated by 
the team’s apparent assumption that even during launch the motor segments would 
not deform, as did eventually happen  (Rogers Commission, 1986).
35 The installment of an Office for Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance 
independent of other NASA responsibilities was one of the recommendations of the 
Rogers Commission.
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in recent years about interdisciplinarity, about transdisciplinary research, 
and about the integration and implementation sciences, metacognition is 
merely mentioned a handful of times in passing and never receives separate 
treatment (Bammer, 2013; Frodeman, Klein, Mitcham, & Holbrook, 2010; 
Hirsch Hadorn et al., 2008).36 
Of course, it is true that some forms of self-reflection and critical thinking 
are heralded as necessary components of interdisciplinary work. Particularly 
in the context of education, critical thinking does receive attention. Critical 
thinking skills enable students to weigh evidence, to analyze and evaluate 
reasoning and arguments, and to identify when scholars are lacking in this area. 
Due to confrontation with the methods and contents of various disciplines, 
interdisciplinary learners are continuously challenged to develop such skills 
(Ivanitskaya, Clark, Montgomery, & Primeau, 2002).37 Critical thinking skills 
are also said to contribute, together with collaboration and reflection skills, to 
the process that yields interdisciplinary understanding (de Greef, Post, Vink, 
& Wenting, 2017). In the context of interdisciplinary research that takes place 
outside of education, though, it is neither metacognition nor critical thinking 
that is considered to be of crucial interest; rather philosophy is considered most 
necessary to guide critical self-reflection by scholars. The question is, though, 
whether philosophy can sufficiently cover the functions of metacognition.
Philosophy has been put center stage in the context of interdisciplinary 
and transdisciplinary research as it is the designated discipline for reflection 
upon disciplinary matrices and, in that context, disciplinary assumptions.38 
It is these assumptions that need addressing, being potential barriers to 
interdisciplinary collaboration and integration. Indeed, they are the barrier 
“that has been most emphasized in the literature on interdisciplinarity: 
the differences in epistemology and hence in specific methods, notions of 
adequate proof, and other fundamental assumptions of different fields” (Lélé 
& Norgaard, 2005, p. 968). In accordance with that observation, contributors 
to the Handbook for Transdisciplinary Research suggest that “[u]sing 
36 It should be noted, though, that Bammer comes close when she devotes an 
interesting analysis to “appreciating different kinds of unknowns,” one of which 
concerns “tacit knowledge” and another “meta-ignorance.” Yet she relates these to 
disciplines and stakeholders and doesn’t treat them as topics for “thinking about 
thinking” more generally (Bammer, 2013, p. 69).  
37  Worth noting is that at the highest level of interdisciplinary learning, the student 
is assumed to use metacognitive skills as well, according to the authors’ model 
(Ivanitskaya, et al., 2002).
38  It is especially because of the theoretical and methodological pluralism that is 
involved in interdisciplinary research–mentioned earlier here–that reflection on 
assumptions is necessary, as I argued in Menken and Keestra, 2016.
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an interdisciplinary approach to the research topic requires the sustained 
communication of explicit and implicit assumptions related to specific 
subject areas.” They continue by stating the potential benefits of such 
communication of assumptions: “This leads to the specifying and clarifying 
of concepts, research questions, and interpretations within and between 
disciplines at every stage of the project” (Simoni, Perrig-Chiello, & Büchler, 
2008, p. 268). It is commonly considered a philosophical task to foster the 
articulation of and communication about these assumptions, yet given 
what we have expressed in this article so far we should doubt whether such 
reflection as philosophy promotes is sufficient for the required monitoring 
and regulation of the–often implicit–representations and processes.
Being very explicit about the value of philosophy for interdisciplinary 
research is the Toolbox Project or Toolbox dialogue method.39 According 
to this method, interdisciplinary collaboration is facilitated by identifying 
individually and collaboratively the epistemological, metaphysical, and 
also normative assumptions team members hold and then exploring 
the differences. A set of questions helps this process along, targeting 
researchers’ thoughts about their motivation for research, their ideas about 
appropriate methods, their views about normative bias, and their beliefs 
about  context-free research, for example (Eigenbrode, et al., 2007). In 
essence, the method aims to remove communication barriers by addressing 
disciplinary assumptions with the help of philosophy, contributing to the 
integration of different disciplinary research worldviews. The Toolbox 
reaches for this aim via two or three steps: First, team members respond to 
a set of epistemological and metaphysical questions; second, the members 
participate in a facilitated dialogue workshop on their responses; and third, 
they again fill in the questionnaire (O’Rourke & Crowley, 2013). 
Important and useful as these steps are for improving interdisciplinary 
collaboration, according to the analysis provided here, successful 
collaboration requires more than such mitigation of the “opacity problems” 
that threaten team communication that are at the focus of a philosophical 
approach like this (MacLeod, 2016 ). A similar conclusion was drawn 
after the case of representational “misalignment” mentioned earlier: “Even 
important philosophical alignments–as in participants’ agreement that an 
39  Michael O’Rourke participated in the ICPS 2015 panel session that is the origin 
of this Special Section of Issues in Interdisciplinary Studies with a presentation on 
“Philosophical Technology and Transdisciplinary Integration: Adapting to Climate 
Change in West Michigan.” The presentation covered the Toolbox approach after a 
brief discussion of “values-informed mental models” that inform researchers’ ethical 
and epistemical thinking. 
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inductive approach was necessary–did not mitigate the conflict in points 
of view. The negative impact of misalignments related to implementation 
appeared to overcome apparent agreements” (DuRussel & Derry, 2005, p. 
217). So when this philosophical process is not accompanied with a process 
facilitating metacognitive knowledge and skills at the individual and team 
level, the impact of such reflections upon the team members’ worldviews and 
the subsequent team research process is likely to be minimal or temporary. 
First, individual experts must recognize and learn to regulate the manifold 
cognitive processes and representations that can contribute to but also impede 
their expert cognition and behavior, at times even leading to suboptimal or 
inconsistent performance. Second, an interdisciplinary team must engage in 
metacognition as a team in order to adjust intra-personal as well inter-personal 
representations. In so doing the team can improve the affective, cognitive, 
behavioral, and social processes that enable it to bring its project adequately 
to an end while being prepared to respond to unknowns in a way that might 
be expected of an interdisciplinary team. Figure 3 represents the process by 
which a team engages adequately in both metacognition and philosophical 
reflection and in so doing produces a more comprehensive interdisciplinary 
understanding.
Figure 3. An interdisciplinary team of experts develops 
together a more comprehensive understanding of a 
phenomenon – represented by the three-dimensional 
cube composed of different elements each of them 
contributes. Their joint or team metacognition and 
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philosophical reflection upon their interdisciplinary 
collaboration facilitate the process of their development 
of an interdisciplinary integration of their distinct mental 
representations of the phenomenon.
§ 3. Concluding Remarks: Interdisciplinary Expert Teams and Their 
Limitations 
In light of the complexity of problems such as interdisciplinary teams 
attempt to solve and the methodological and theoretical pluralism involved 
in our investigations of these problems, how is it possible that so many of 
these problems have been solved? How is it possible at all that the cognitive 
representations experts have been developing about these phenomena 
have been successfully integrated with each other and implemented into 
technologies, insights, policies, and understandings that have at least in part 
fulfilled the aims for which they were developed? The question can invite a 
metaphysical approach, yet here I’ve focused on its epistemological nature, 
partly motivated by the recognition that experts can also be incorrect or 
err, leading to disasters like the Challenger accident, for which the team’s 
failed handling of a fatal unknown was responsible. After summarizing this 
article’s cognitive-scientific and philosophical insights pertaining to the 
question, I will close with a brief discussion of a method that seems to me 
promising in providing a process that helps in the integration of different 
expert contributions while acknowledging these background conditions and 
the constraints on the integrative results stemming from these conditions–
the process of Reflective Equilibrium.
The first section of this article describes the cognitive processes 
underlying individual cognition, in which both implicit and explicit mental 
representations play important roles. Learning and the development of 
expertise entail that an individual develop not just one but multiple mental 
representations. Compared to those of a beginner, the representations of 
experts are much more extensive and complex. Thanks to their assembling 
a rich “collection” of such complex mental representations pertaining to 
their field of expertise, experts are able to recognize complex phenomena 
quickly and respond to them flexibly. New representations develop by 
way of Representational Redescription of previously developed ones. To a 
large extent, this occurs implicitly and without requiring experts’ conscious 
efforts. However, experts also devote considerable amounts of time to 
deliberate practice in which they are repeatedly practicing, monitoring, and 
evaluating their performance while applying new strategies for correcting 
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or improving it and for further modifying their representations. Such 
practice implies that experts are learning to engage in metacognition: 
They have learned to observe and regulate some of their own cognitive 
processes and representations, which can explain their improving 
performances. Metacognition is according to this analysis complementary 
to the philosophical reflection on disciplinary assumptions that is often 
recommended as an important precursor to interdisciplinary integration of 
insights. Such reflection on epistemological, metaphysical, and normative 
assumptions is related to metacognition as these assumptions form in some 
sense the background conditions for the chunks, patterns, and structures 
that characterize expert mental representations. However, metacognitive 
knowledge and skills contribute more to the acquisition and performance of 
expertise and cannot be replaced by such philosophical reflection.  
These insights into cognitive processes and representations and the 
metacognition supportive of them are brought to bear on interdisciplinary 
collaboration in section two of this article. In addition to handling the 
processes and representations involved in expertise, experts functioning 
in interdisciplinary teams have to coordinate their contributions with 
those of colleagues from other disciplines. To that end they develop also 
team mental representations in which task-related, team-related, process- 
related, and goal-related information about the team project are integrated. 
I have argued that for interdisciplinary team cognition to be developed 
adequately, team members need to engage in both individual and team 
metacognition. Assisted by metacognition, team members coordinate their 
contributions both in an implicit and in an explicit way, modifying the 
team mental representations accordingly while adjusting their individual 
expert representations in parallel. Again, team philosophical reflection on 
assumptions underlying the disciplinary perspectives of team members does 
complement team metacognition, yet it does not completely overlap with the 
team’s metacognitive monitoring and regulation of individual and collective 
cognitive processes and representations. Psychological, affective, and social 
influences are just a few important factors for team cognition and behavior 
that deserve to be monitored and regulated with team metacognition.
These insights into the cognitive processes and representations involved in 
interdisciplinary collaborations, potentially facilitated by metacognition and 
philosophical reflection, go a long way in explaining how interdisciplinary 
team cognition is possible. Yet this explanation of how the interdisciplinary 
integration of insights is possible does not amount to its full explanation. For 
the realization of an interdisciplinary integration of insights we still need an 
additional process, a process that bears similarities to both metacognition 
Metacognition and Reflection by Interdisciplinary Experts | 159
Stability, Instability, and Interdisciplinarity
and philosophical reflection and that takes the pluralism from which we 
started seriously, while maximizing the coherence among the disciplinary 
contributions.40 This requires a reflective balancing act of the team, in which 
disciplinary contributions are weighed against the team’s goals and norms, 
while acknowledging the uncertainties and incompleteness inherent in 
knowledge production. Thinking in a similar way, John Rawls has proposed 
a Reflective Equilibrium process that helps to bring moral convictions, 
principles or rules, and other relevant beliefs into maximum coherence. 
Assuming that it is impossible to offer absolute foundations to truths and 
norms, reaching coherence by balancing elements against each other and 
refining or revising them where it seems fit is the best option available 
(Rawls, 1974). Extending this iterative balancing process, it can also include 
various background theories or assumptions that humans implicitly adhere 
to while developing considered judgments, theories or assumptions that 
deserve explicit attention as well (Daniels, 1979). 
Taking into account that interdisciplinary team collaboration requires 
team members to bring their distinct insights to bear on a joint project, while 
acknowledging that these insights rest upon–often implicit–assumptions 
and norms, I argue that a similar process can support their efforts. Indeed, 
applying such a process would render interdisciplinary learning as “the 
construction of systems of thought in reflective equilibrium” (Boix Mansilla, 
2010, p. 298).41 The account of interdisciplinary team cognition proposed 
here advises a team and its members to engage in metacognition and in 
philosophical reflection, helping them to explicitly articulate and deliberate 
about their individual and team representations, assessing, evaluating, and 
adjusting them together. For their maximally coherent interdisciplinary 
integration, Reflective Equilibrium offers a promising method that could 
play a role as a third component in optimal team process. Particularly when 
applied in an interdisciplinary team context in which empirical data are taken 
seriously, it can further assist in problem solving while discouraging self-
justification and biased judgments that easily taint disciplinary perspectives 
(De Vries & Van Leeuwen, 2010). In other words, interdisciplinary 
40  There are alternative options available for such a “reflective balancing act” 
by interdisciplinary teams, each with its own characteristics and conditions of 
applicability. Many of these have been presented in Bammer, 2013; Frodeman, et al., 
2010; and Hirsch Hadorn, et al., 2008.
41  In the context of the Toolbox Project’s approach to interdisciplinary research, 
discussed here in § 2.3, Reflective Equilibrium has been suggested as well, enabling 
the balancing between a priori and a posteriori insights that mutually influence each 
other in a feedback loop (O’Rourke, 2013). 
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understanding or problem solving requires both individuals and teams to 
make their disciplinary contributions while also engaging in metacognition, 
philosophical reflection, and a process of Reflective Equilibrium, the latter 
being meant to assist in the integration of disciplinary contributions in a 
maximally coherent and justifiable way. With both individuals and teams 
adopting these practices, one may hope that a novel unknown, such as that 
that destroyed the Challenger, will be not only recognized and appreciated 
by individual experts but also sufficiently and reflectively balanced against 
other considerations and insights by them and by the team as a whole so 
as to prevent other such disasters and promote successes in the problem-
solving process instead. 
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Appendix: Prompts or Questions for Metacognition
Below is a variety of prompts or questions that elicit metacognition in 
interdisciplinary individuals or teams. They can target metacognitive 
knowledge (MK), metacognitive monitoring (MM), or metacognitive 
regulation (MR).
•	 Do you have any biases against certain types of research or 
explanations. Could you nonetheless be convinced of their value 
for the current project? (MK)
•	 Based on what properties do you categorize the relevant objects 
of your research? Would other categorizations be possible? If you 
use statistics, could you apply another threshold value for finding 
correlations? If not, why? (MM; MR)
•	 How does this metaphor or this model of the research topic help you 
to make connections to experience or knowledge you’ve gathered 
previously? Would it be helpful to make some adjustments to the 
metaphor or model? (MM; MR)
•	 When you last performed a task like this, what did you do that you 
should do differently this time? What should you do again this time 
because it worked well before? (MK; MR)
•	 Given the interdisciplinary context of your task, how could you 
modify your usual strategy in performing it? What would perhaps 
be lost in that case? (MK; MR) 
•	 Do you think it possible confusion about results so far might require 
you to reconsider some basic assumptions or definitions regarding 
the problem at stake. (MM; MR)
•	 Might learning the insights into the problem of other team members 
prompt you to realize that your initial insights were lacking in some 
sense. (MM)
•	 Why do you think that the task you proposed to perform is optimal 
for solving the problem at stake? Would an alternative route be 
possible? (MM; MR)
•	 What goals have you as a team determined and what plan for 
reaching those goals? What are the issues that might arise with the 
current plan? Do your answers to these questions vary? (MM; MR) 
•	 When you compare your visual representations of the complex 
system under scrutiny with those of other team members, can you 
identify differences among the representations. What features have 
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been lost or been fore- and back-grounded, for example? (MM)
•	 Of all the features of the problem under scrutiny, what does and 
what does not make sense from your disciplinary perspective? Or 
what is especially difficult to understand? What would you like to 
know more about? (MM; MR)
•	 Are you ready to use novel problem-solving strategies or are you 
inclined to apply those that have worked in the past and avoid 
others? (MK; MR)
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